Asymmetric information and news disclosure rules

被引:24
|
作者
Spiegel, M
Subrahmanyam, A
机构
[1] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Grad Sch Management, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
[2] Yale Univ, Sch Management, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
关键词
asymmetric information; market breakdowns; trading halts;
D O I
10.1006/jfin.2000.0294
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
When the imminence of news announcements is not public knowledge, many traders will lack information on both the mean and Variance of private information. Our analysis of such a setting in both single and multisecurity contexts implies that disclosure of impending information events by Arms can bound variance uncertainty and thereby improve investor welfare by mitigating the market breakdown problem. We also find that the equilibrium pricing functions are nonlinear; specifically, convex for small trades and concave for larger ones. In addition, we predict that large transactions will be followed by large levels of volatility. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 022, 026, 522. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:363 / 403
页数:41
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