Harnessing Policy Authenticity for Hidden Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption

The field of cryptography has endeavored to solve numerous security problems. However, a common premise of many of those problems is that the encryptor always generates the ciphertext correctly. Around 10 years ago, this premise was not a problem. However, due to the rapid development and the use of the cloud, which has introduced various access policies and functionalities to provide higher security, it is not correct to assume that this premise is always applied. A "Fake Policy Attack", which we introduce in this article, is an attack that incorrectly sets the access policy of the ciphertext against the system rules so that users who do not meet the rules can decrypt the ciphertext. In other words, it is an attack that ignores the rules of the system and eventually breaks the security and leaks information. This attack can be more critical for the application environments that require strong security not to leak any related information about ciphertext. In this article, we demonstrate the possible threat of the Fake Policy Attack by providing two relevant examples. Then, we propose a scheme called Policy Authenticable ABE (PA-ABE) to resolve this issue. We provide a formal security analysis of the proposed scheme and performance evaluation results based on our implementation.