Human dignity and the dignity of creatures

In their report for the Swiss government on the notion of the dignity of creatures, Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber analyze the relationship between human dignity and the dignity of creatures, taking them as two categorically different concepts. Human dignity is defined as the "moral right not to be humiliated,'' whereas the dignity of creatures is taken to be "the inherent value of non-human living beings.'' To my mind there is no need to draw a categorical distinction between the two concepts. Both notions could be brought together under an all-encompassing concept of the inherent value of living beings, humans and non-humans alike, a concept one could name "the dignity of living beings.'' Indeed, this very notion underlies the position taken in the report, although this is not made explicit by the authors themselves. As the aim of the paper is only to clarify the concepts used, I do not go beyond this "internal'' critique of their position, i.e., I don't assess how the claims articulated via these concepts - the claim that humans and/or creatures have an inherent value consisting in a supposed intrinsic good - are to be justified, although I myself would be rather skeptical that this might be successfully done.