The propositional limits as an element of transition in Wittgenstein's thought

This paper intends to sustain that, in Wittgenstein, the notion of propositional limit characterises an element of transition between the non-congnitivism, expressed in the Tractatus, and the subsequent philosophy, especially in the Investigations. In this direction, it is possible to point out that the limit of utterability marks the rupture in the analysis between the scientific propositions and the "ethical propositions". Whereas the former have the truth value, that is, they can be true or false, the latter lack of meaning because they cannot be expressed by an ideal notation. For this reason, the scientific discourse, unlike the ordinary moral discourse, expands as we limit the boundaries of language (and, therefore, of thought). This allows us to accept as a conclusion only the existence of elementary propositions that are not analysable anymore. Therefore, it is not possible to formulate moral propositions, but only utter judgements, considering that the values are not supervened qualities or properties of the things. For this reason, the division between fact and value, concerning logic and ethic, is the only possibility for the meaningful language of science to be able to represent reality