Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections

被引：10
|
作者：
El Ouafdi, Abdelhalim [1 ]
Lepelley, Dominique [1 ]
Smaoui, Hatem [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ St Reunion, CEMOI, St Clotilde, Reunion, France
来源：
THEORY AND DECISION | 2020年 / 88卷 / 02期
关键词：
Voting rules; Voting paradoxes; Condorcet efficiency; Condorcet loser; Manipulability; EHRHART SERIES; 4; CANDIDATES; POLYNOMIALS;
D O I：
10.1007/s11238-019-09724-5
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The main purpose of this paper is to compute the theoretical likelihood of some electoral outcomes under the impartial anonymous culture in four-candidate elections by using the last versions of software like LattE or Normaliz. By comparison with the three-candidate case, our results allow to analyze the impact of the number of candidates on the occurrence of these voting outcomes.
引用
收藏
页码：205 / 229
页数：25
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