A dynamic analysis of executive stock options: Determinants and consequences

被引:4
|
作者
Chen, Yenn-Ru [2 ]
Lee, Bong Soo [1 ]
机构
[1] Florida State Univ, Dept Finance, Tallahassee, FL 32312 USA
[2] Natl Cheng Kung Univ, Grad Inst Finance & Banking, Tainan 70101, Taiwan
关键词
Executive stock options; Growth opportunity; Capital investment and performance; Dynamic analysis; INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; FIRM PERFORMANCE; COMPENSATION; RISK; OWNERSHIP; DIVIDEND; PAY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.10.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate the determinants of executive stock options (ESOs) and their impact on risky investment and subsequent firm performance in a dynamic setting. We find that, first. the dynamic response of ESOs to growth opportunity and risk is positive and lasts for two to three years. Second, the dynamic response of risky investments to option compensation is positive but converges to zero after three years. More importantly, the positive effect of ESOs on risky investments is observed when CEOs' personal risk-aversion is taken into account. Third, accounting performance responds positively to the risky, option-induced investment, but the dynamic effect lasts only for one year. Meanwhile, when managers undertake more risky investments than what ESOs imply, accounting performance responds negatively to the over-investment. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:88 / 103
页数:16
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