Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights

被引:9
|
作者
Janssen, Maarten C. W.
Karamychev, Vladimir A.
机构
[1] Erasmus Univ, Dept Econ, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands
[2] Tinbergen Inst, Rotterdam, Netherlands
关键词
aftermarkets; auctions; risk attitude;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We demonstrate that auctioning market licenses may result in higher market prices than assigning them via more random allocation mechanisms. When future market profit is uncertain, winning an auction is like winning a lottery ticket. If firms differ in risk attitudes, auctions select the least risk-averse firm, which, in turn, set a higher price (or a higher quantity, in case quantity is the decision variable) in the marketplace than an average firm. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:576 / 582
页数:7
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