Exploration on the low-carbon strategy based on the evolutionary game between the government and highway logistics enterprises

Government and highway logistics enterprises, which are the parties who implement low-carbon policy, are considered comprehensively to disclose the time they prefer to implement low-carbon strategies and to determine the advantageous "commanding height" of highway logistics enterprises in the era of global "low-carbon revolution." In this paper, the evolutionary game model between government and highway logistics enterprises was established based on the evolutionary game theory. From the model hypothesis and the stability analysis of the evolutionary game model between government and enterprises, the government analyzed the adaptability of incentive policies. The highway logistics enterprises also considered the adaptability of implementing low-carbon behaviors. Finally, the dynamic evolution path diagram of the asymmetric game system between government and enterprises was drawn. The goal of the government and highway logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon policies was realized by changing the initial state of the game. According to the analysis of the model results, the implementations of low-carbon strategies by government and highway logistics enterprises are influenced by many aspects. Whether highway logistics enterprises implement low-carbon strategies is the consequence of the game between government and highway logistics enterprises concerning a variety of issues.