Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain

被引：62

作者：

Friebel, Guido ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

Heinz, Matthias ^{[2
,4
]}

Krueger, Miriam ^{[5
]}

Zubanov, Nikolay ^{[3
,6
]}

机构：

[1] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, Theodor W Adorno Pl 4, D-60323 Frankfurt, Germany

[2] CEPR, London, England

[3] IZA, Bonn, Germany

[4] Univ Cologne, Albertus Magnus Pl, D-50923 Cologne, Germany

[5] Deutsch Bundesbank, Wilhelm Epstein Str 14, D-60431 Frankfurt, Germany

[6] Univ Konstanz, Univ Str 10, D-78464 Constance, Germany

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2017年 / 107卷 / 08期

关键词：

HUMAN-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; FIELD EXPERIMENTS; PEER PRESSURE; FIRM LEVEL; PRODUCTIVITY; PAY; COUNTRIES; WORKER; CONTRACTS; WORKPLACE;

D O I：

10.1257/aer.20160788

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a field experiment with a retail chain (1,300 employees, 193 shops), randomly selected sales teams received a bonus. The bonus increases both sales and number of customers dealt with by 3 percent. Each dollar spent on the bonus generates $3.80 in sales, and $2.10 in profit. Wages increase by 2.2 percent while inequality rises only moderately. The analysis suggests effort complementarities to be important, and the effectiveness of peer pressure in overcoming free-riding to be limited. After rolling out the bonus scheme, the performance of the treatment and control shops converges, suggesting long-term stability of the treatment effect. (JEL D22, J31, J33, L25, L81, M53, M54)

引用

页码：2168 / 2203

页数：36

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