Kant's Conceptualism: a New Reading of the Transcendental Deduction

被引:3
|
作者
Shaddock, Justin B. [1 ]
机构
[1] Williams Coll, Philosophy Dept, Williamstown, MA 01267 USA
关键词
REPRESENTATION;
D O I
10.1111/papq.12189
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
I defend a novel interpretation of Kant's conceptualism regarding the contents of our perceptual experiences. Conceptualist interpreters agree that Kant's Deduction aims to prove that intuitions require the categories for their spatiality and temporality. But conceptualists disagree as to which features of space and time make intuitions require the categories. Interpreters have cited the singularity, unity, infinity, and homogeneity of space and time. But this is incompatible with Kant's Aesthetic, which aims to prove that these same features qualify space and time as intuitions, not concepts. On my interpretation, the feature is objectivity. Space and time are objective, in that they ground our judgments in geometry and mechanics.
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收藏
页码:464 / 488
页数:25
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