Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

被引:7
|
作者
Tasnadi, Attila [1 ]
机构
[1] Corvinus Univ Budapest, Dept Math, H-1093 Budapest, Hungary
关键词
Forchheimer; Dominant firm; Price leadership; PRICE LEADERSHIP; COURNOT EQUILIBRIA; OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS; STACKELBERG; MODEL; COMPETITION; ENTRY; COMMITMENT;
D O I
10.1007/s00712-010-0108-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer's model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.
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页码:251 / 266
页数:16
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