Antitrust Enforcement Against Platform MFNs

被引:3
|
作者
Baker, Jonathan B. [1 ]
Morton, Fiona Scott [2 ]
机构
[1] Amer Univ, Washington Coll Law, Law, Washington, DC 20016 USA
[2] Yale Univ, Sch Management, Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
来源
YALE LAW JOURNAL | 2018年 / 127卷 / 07期
关键词
COMPETITION; RULEMAKING;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
Antitrust enforcement against anticompetitive platform most favored nations (MFN) provisions (also termed pricing parity provisions) can help protect competition in online markets. An online platform imposes a platform MFN when it requires that providers using its platform not offer their products or services at a lower price on other platforms. These contractual provisions may be employed by a variety of online platforms offering, for example, hotel and transportation bookings, consumer goods, digital goods, or handmade craft products. They have been the subject of antitrust enforcement in Europe but have drawn only limited antitrust scrutiny in the United States. Our Feature explains why MFNs employed by online platforms can harm competition by keeping prices high and discouraging the entry of new platform rivals, through both exclusionary and collusive mechanisms, notwithstanding the possibility that some MFNs may facilitate investment by limiting customer freeriding. We discuss ways by which government enforcers in the United States and private plaintiffs could potentially reach anticompetitive platform MFNs under the Sherman Act, and the litigation challenges such cases present.
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页码:2176 / 2202
页数:27
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