The selection of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act

被引:0
|
作者
Coolidge, BE [1 ]
Ahearn, LB [1 ]
机构
[1] Wilmer Cutler Pickering, Washington, DC 20037 USA
来源
SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL | 2001年 / 28卷 / 04期
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D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
With the enactment of the lead plaintiff provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Congress hoped to encourage large institutional investors to assume the role of lead plaintiffs in securities class actions. However, since the Act's passage in 1995, large institutional investors have shown only sporadic interest in sewing as lead plaintiffs in these actions, leaving their control largely In the hands of the plaintiffs' bar. This article examines the lead plaintiff selection process and the courts' willingness to select an institutional investor to serve as lead plaintiff over aggregations aggregations of unrelated plaintiffs.
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页码:279 / 325
页数:47
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