DO SHAREHOLDERS OR STAKEHOLDERS APPROPRIATE THE RENTS FROM CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION? THE INFLUENCE OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE

被引:122
|
作者
David, Parthiban [1 ]
O'Brien, Jonathan P. [2 ]
Yoshikawa, Toru [3 ]
Delios, Andrew [4 ]
机构
[1] American Univ, Kogod Sch Business, Washington, DC 20016 USA
[2] Rensselaer Polytech Inst, Lally Sch Management & Technol, Troy, NY 12181 USA
[3] McMaster Univ, Hamilton, ON L8S 4L8, Canada
[4] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Strategy & Policy, Singapore, Singapore
来源
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 2010年 / 53卷 / 03期
关键词
FREE CASH FLOW; INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION; FIRM PERFORMANCE; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; CAPITAL-INVESTMENT; CEO COMPENSATION; AGENCY COSTS; JAPANESE; GOVERNANCE; PRODUCT;
D O I
10.5465/AMJ.2010.51469005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Prior work on the performance consequences of corporate diversification has treated all powerful owners as seeking the same benefits from diversification (i.e, higher profit rather than growth) and therefore limiting value appropriation by other stakeholders such as employees and managers. In contrast, we distinguish between domestic "relational" owners and foreign "transactional" owners in Japanese corporations. Although transactional owners do indeed prioritize profitability when diversifying, relational owners primarily seek growth rather than profits from diversification. Furthermore, relational owners also allow managers and employees to appropriate more of the rents arising from diversification than do transactional owners.
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页码:636 / 654
页数:19
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