This article proposes to revisit one of the most debated issues in the philosophy of history: what is truth in history writing? The focus of the article is avowedly very narrow: it will not say anything about truth and objectivity in general; all that it aims at is to suggest one possible - pragmatist - approach to making sense of the way truth and objectivity function within the discipline of history. It argues that history doesn't need a new theory of truth; rather, it is necessary to analyse in theoretical terms how truth is understood and used in historical inquiry. Thus, the relevant question is not whether history satisfies one or another theory of truth or objectivity, but which are the conceptions of truth and objectivity practised within the discipline of history. This article is not interested in truth in any general metaphysical sense, but as an epistemic term in a certain given - historiographical - use; and objectivity is understood as an epistemic virtue valued in a specific contemporary scientific community, that of professional historians. The main argument of the article is developed in three interrelated steps. First, the article makes the case for a pragmatic "truth pact" in history writing, arguing that the conditions of historical truth depend on the illocutionary force of historical utterance. Second, it proposes that this "truth pact" is "guaranteed" by fellow historians or, in other words: truth claims in history writing are based not on their direct relation with reality but on a disciplinary consensus as to the methods of inquiry, cognitive values and epistemic virtues. Third, it will make a clear connection between truth and proof in history writing, arguing that the "truth pact" is grounded in a critical analysis of the available evidence. The article's approach is placed under the general rubric of "pragmatism", but it conceives of "pragmatism" in a very broad sense - more precisely, in two different senses at once. On the one hand, "pragmatism" is understood in linguistic terms, that is, the article relies partially on the standpoints of pragmatic linguistics, analysing history writing in the light of the theory of speech acts. But on the other hand, the article's reflections belong to the tradition of pragmatist philosophy in a very general sense of the term, drawing inspiration from the views of Peirce, James and Dewey, as well as their later followers. Thus the article can, in a certain sense, be regarded as a small contribution towards working out a pragmatist philosophy - or theory - of history, something that seems to be an important general aim for the future. Although the discussion of truth and objectivity are very important to the discipline of history, this article argues that this should not be the final port of destination for the philosophy of history; rather, the construction of a common understanding of truth and objectivity enables us to launch discussions of other issues that seem at least as important for the understanding and making sense of history writing. The truth intent and regulative ideal of objectivity are merely the prerequisites of academic history writing; as soon as they are satisfied, new problems of a different order arise concerning originality, thematic variations, ways of representation, stylistic devices, ideological commitments, etc. As long as we remain in the grip of an epistemic fear for the truth value of history writing, we will continue to struggle to deal fruitfully with other questions that are, in fact, extremely important for understanding the possibilities, limitations, and essentiality of history writing.
