Logical Truth

被引：0
|
作者：
Antonsen, Paal Fjeldvig
机构：
来源：
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF LOGIC | 2019年 / 16卷 / 07期
关键词：
Logical truth; truth in a model; anti-exceptionalism about logic; possible semantic interpretation; analyticity; MODELS;
D O I：
10.26686/ajl.v16i7.5914
中图分类号：
B81 [逻辑学（论理学）];
学科分类号：
010104 ; 010105 ;
摘要：
On the model-theoretic account, a sentence is logically true just in case it is true on all possible semantic interpretations. We differentiate four ways one can interpret the modality 'possible' in this definition, and argue that one of these readings is not subject to the criticism levelled against the model-theoretic account by Etchemendy. By explicating the four readings we also draw some consequences for what linguistic evidence a selection of logical theories should be sensitive to.
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页码：187 / 201
页数：15
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