How Labor Market Institutions Matter for Worker Compensation

被引:0
|
作者
Nunn, Ryan [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Hunt, Jennifer [4 ,5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Bank Minneapolis, Appl Res Community Dev & Engagement, Minneapolis, MN 55480 USA
[2] Brookings Inst & Policy, Econ Studies, Washington, DC USA
[3] Hamilton Project, Washington, DC USA
[4] Rutgers State Univ, Econ, New Brunswick, NJ USA
[5] US Dept Labor, Washington, DC 20210 USA
[6] US Dept Treasury, Microecon Anal, Washington, DC 20226 USA
关键词
labor market institutions; wages; labor market policies; UNITED-STATES; WAGE; UNIONS; UNIONIZATION; BARRIER; IMPACTS; LAW;
D O I
10.1177/00027162211035965
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Labor markets deviate substantially from the competitive ideal, and policies and institutions affect workers' outcomes. Over the last 45 years, the dramatic increase in compensation of high earners and weak or stagnant growth for low and middle earners have shone a spotlight on the ways in which labor market institutions sometimes work to the detriment of lower-paid workers. In this article, we survey several institutions-minimum wages, private sector unions, noncompete agreements, and occupational licensing-considering how they have evolved in ways that affect workers' outcomes, given that the labor market is characterized by uneven distribution of market gains. We describe the modern labor market as one that substantially features alternative work arrangements and labor market concentration, and we consider the implications of this for public policy. Those policies, along with the surveyed institutions, are the focus of our final section that discusses key options for improving worker outcomes.
引用
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页码:225 / 241
页数:17
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