A Study of First-price Sealed-bid Procurement Auctions for Divisible Items

被引：0
|
作者：
Wei, Yihua [1 ]
Hu, Qiying [2 ]
Yue, Wuyi [3 ]
机构：
[1] Shanghai Univ, Coll Management, Shanghai 200444, Peoples R China
[2] Fudan Univ, Sch Management, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[3] Konan Univ, Dept Intelligence & Informat, Kobe, Hyogo 6588501, Japan
来源：
OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND ITS APPLICATIONS, PROCEEDINGS | 2009年 / 10卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Procurement auctions; First-price sealed-bid; Optimal bidding strategy;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];
学科分类号：
070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
In this paper, we study first-price sealed-bid procurement auctions for divisible items. The auctions are divided into two cases: the auctioneer either does or does not compensate for an oversupply of the quantity purchased. The bidding behaviors of bidders are modeled, and then the optimal bidding strategy for bidders is obtained. It is shown that the bidder's bidding price exits and is increasing in his cost. Moreover, we show that the bidder can gain more profit in cases where the auctioneer compensates the overage supply quantity.
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页码：409 / +
页数：2
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