STRATEGIC SIGNALING AND NEW TECHNOLOGICALLY SUPERIOR PRODUCT INTRODUCTION: A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL WITH SIMULATION

被引：0
|
作者：
Tavana, Madjid [1 ,2 ]
Di Caprio, Debora [3 ]
Santos-Arteaga, Francisco J. [4 ]
机构：
[1] La Salle Univ, Distinguished Chair Business Analyt, Business Syst & Analyt Dept, Philadelphia, PA 19141 USA
[2] Univ Paderborn, Fac Business Adm & Econ, Business Informat Syst Dept, D-33098 Paderborn, Germany
[3] York Univ, Dept Math & Stat, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
[4] Free Univ Bolzano, Fac Econ & Management, Bolzano, Italy
来源：
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMY | 2018年 / 24卷 / 04期
关键词：
game theory; simulations; product planning; information sharing; strategic signaling; technological improvement; INFORMATION ACQUISITION MODEL; PATENT LITIGATION; USER ACCEPTANCE; INNOVATION; SMARTPHONE; EXPLORATION; ADVANTAGE; CONSUMERS; INTERNET; BEHAVIOR;
D O I：
10.3846/tede.2018.4531
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
User acceptance of technology is essential to determine its success. The current paper incorporates the main properties of the technology acceptance models (TAMs) developed by management scholars into a pre-commitment signaling duopolistic framework, where two competing firms must decide the level of technological improvement of the products being introduced. As a result, the corresponding equilibria of the duopolistic technological games will be determined by demand-based factors, providing a novel approach and complementing the current supply-based economic and operational research models developed in the literature. The proposed model will be simulated numerically to illustrate the strategic optimality of the update process of smartphone and tablet characteristics defined by Apple and Samsung as the market developed.
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页码：1466 / 1498
页数：33
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