Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics

被引:95
|
作者
Besanko, David [1 ]
Doraszelski, Ulrich [2 ]
Kryukov, Yaroslav [3 ]
Satterthwaite, Mark [1 ]
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, Kellogg Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Tepper Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
关键词
Dynamic stochastic games; Markov-perfect equilibrium; learning-by-doing; organizational forgetting; industry dynamics; multiple equilibria; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM-MODEL; PROGRESS FUNCTIONS; MARKET-STRUCTURE; CURVE; SPILLOVERS; PRODUCTIVITY; COMPETITION; KNOWLEDGE; ALGORITHM; EVOLUTION;
D O I
10.3982/ECTA6994
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting are empirically important in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics. We show that forgetting does not simply negate learning. Rather, they are distinct economic forces that interact in subtle ways to produce a great variety of pricing behaviors and industry dynamics. In particular, a model with learning and forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior, varying degrees of long-run industry concentration ranging from moderate leadership to absolute dominance, and multiple equilibria.
引用
收藏
页码:453 / 508
页数:56
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