Perception and Knowledge: A Phenomenological Account

Walter Hopp's book is above all an original defence of the thesis that the subjective character of perceptual experiences consists of their representational content, together with a partially original theory of the epistemic justification of beliefs. These views are based in the book on an also largely original theory of the content of perceptual experiences. My aim in this critical notice is to outline the position espoused in the book with regard to these themes - both positively and critically - and provide some additional context for them, so that the reach and significance of the book can be more readily appreciated. The notice aims further to show that Hopp's work occupies a neo-Husserlian viewpoint in analytic philosophy of perception and language which is analogous to the better known neo-Fregean perspectives in the philosophy of language and thought, and may even contribute to partially redress the balance between the Husserlian and the Fregean strands in current philosophy.