Shill bidding in online English auctions with a random number of bidders

被引:5
|
作者
Ma, J
Wang, SY
Lai, KK [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Int Business & Econ, Sch Management, Beijing 100029, Peoples R China
[2] Chinese Acad Sci, Acad Math & Syst Sci, Inst Syst Sci, Beijing 100080, Peoples R China
[3] Hunan Univ, Coll Business Adm, Changsha 410082, Hunan, Peoples R China
[4] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Management Sci, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
independent private value (IPV); shill bidding; online auctions; single round auctions; multi-round auctions;
D O I
10.1142/S0219622004001239
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Shill bidding has increased substantially with the explosion in the number of online auctions. For English auctions with conventional intermediation fee schedules and a continuous increment of the bid, sellers may profit from shill bidding, which is illegal. To deter shill bidding, Wang et al.(31) designed a mechanism - the shill-deterrent fee schedule (SDFS) which makes shill bidding unprofitable. This paper analyzes the feasibility of applying SDFS rules to both single round and multi-round English auctions in a framework of independent private value (IPV) with a random number of bidders. It is shown that most of the results in Wang et al.(31) remain true at our cases. In addition, we also propose an approach for sellers to reset the subsequent reserves in multi-round English auctions.
引用
收藏
页码:539 / 562
页数:24
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