Matching Service Providers and Customers in Two-Sided Dynamic Markets

被引:11
|
作者
Xu, Xinkai [1 ]
Wang, Chun [1 ]
Zeng, Yong [1 ]
Deng, Xiaoguang [1 ]
Wang, Hansong [1 ]
Barklon, Daniil [2 ]
Thibault, Daniel [2 ]
机构
[1] Concordia Univ, Concordia Inst Informat Syst Engn, Montreal, PQ H3G 1M8, Canada
[2] Proship Entertainment Inc, Montreal, PQ H3C 1A8, Canada
来源
IFAC PAPERSONLINE | 2015年 / 48卷 / 03期
关键词
two-sided matching; dynamic markets; market design; service computing; SCHOOL CHOICE; MECHANISM;
D O I
10.1016/j.ifacol.2015.06.416
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
This paper presents matching algorithms for two-sided dynamic service markets where service providers and customers form two disjoint sets and an agent from one side of the market can be matched only with an agent from the other side. We address the challenges derived from dynamic changes of the market. The algorithms are designed based on re-matching and repair-based matching models. The rematching algorithm is straightforward and easy to implement. However, it does not have a mechanism to maintain matching consistency with the previous matching solution. Instead of computing a completely new matching solution, the repair-based matching algorithm maintain good matching consistency by repairing only the part of matching affected by the dynamic changes. In addition to better matching consistency, we show that the matching solutions generated by the repair-based matching algorithm are also stable. (C) 2015, IFAC (International Federation of Automatic Control) Hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:2208 / 2213
页数:6
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