The boundaries of abortion law: Systems theory from Parsons to Luhmann and Habermas

This article examines competing hypotheses on law derived from the theories of Talcott Parsons, Niklas Luhmann, and Jurgen Habermas in light of the recent history of U.S. abortion law, specifically the Supreme Court's rulings on abortion over the past two decades. The evidence I advance suggests that Luhmann's theory cannot explain how abortion law since 1973 has developed with the influence of certain nonlegal contexts. The perspectives of Parsons and Habermas, on the other hand adequately grasp some of the outside influences on the legal abortion process. Parsons's theory particularly shows its strength in accounting for the political influences on abortion law and the individualistic nature of the American legal system. Habermas's theory rightly emphasizes the delicate force of lifeworld claims over the normativity of law as well as the relevance of a medical-technocratic reformulation of legal justifications. I conclude by arguing that sociological analyses of law should strive to conceptually elucidate the continuing struggles over and through law, and that they should recognize, particularly in light of growing multiculturalism, the loss of integrative force modern law continues to ascribe to itself.