The Impact of Trade Credit on Financing Strategy in a Dual Capital-Constrained Supply Chain

This study analyzes the financing strategy of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, both subject to capital constraints. Specifically, the bank provides loans to the manufacturer, who then grants trade credit to the retailer. Based on the three-party game analysis framework of the bank, manufacturer, and retailer, this paper constructs a supply chain financing model under the information symmetry and information asymmetry structures, respectively; measures the maximum financing ability of the manufacturer; and discusses the influence of trade credit, moral hazard, and information structure on the manufacturer's and bank's strategies. The results show that under the trade credit situation, it is critical for the bank to provide loan to manufacturer who does not have moral hazard. The maximum financing capacity of the manufacturer is affected by the rate of return on moral hazard and the intensity of trade credit default. The increase of trade credit default intensity and risk exposure will lead to the increase of the interest rate of bank loan, and in the case of information asymmetry, the bank will often ask for a higher interest rate to deal with the information disadvantage. The strategy for the bank to make the credit line is more complex, and the degree of information asymmetry plays a positive moderating effect on the influence of trade credit on the credit line. Our findings provide implications for participants who implement financing actions to improve their financial performance and control the moral hazard and default risk along a supply chain.