A Dynamic Reciprocal Dumping Model of International Trade

被引：2
|
作者：
Fujiwara, Kenji [1 ]
机构：
[1] Kwansei Gakuin Univ, Sch Econ, Nishinomiya, Hyogo 6628501, Japan
来源：
ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 16卷 / 03期
关键词：
differential game; trade liberalization; losses from trade; dynamic duopoly; PARETO INFERIOR TRADE; DIFFERENTIAL GAME; COMPETITION; STRATEGIES;
D O I：
10.1080/16081625.2009.9720842
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This paper constructs a differential game model of reciprocal dumping to reconsider the welfare effects of trade liberalization (tariff reductions). We show that welfare in autarky exceeds welfare in trade for any tariff level, namely that any trade is detrimental. Comparing Our result with a static result, we discuss that the closed-loop property of feedback strategies in differential games plays a significant role in Our argument.
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页码：255 / 270
页数：16
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