The Problem of Other Minds What Problem? Whose Mind?

被引:1
|
作者
Tullmann, Katherine [1 ]
机构
[1] No Arizona Univ, Dept Philosophy, 803 S Beaver St, Flagstaff, AZ 86011 USA
关键词
gender; problem of other minds; theory of mind; race; rationality; simulation theory; theory theory; INJUSTICE;
D O I
10.1111/meta.12386
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
This paper reimagines the traditional problem of other minds. On a Cartesian view, the problem involves humans' inability to perceive other persons' minds. Similarly, Gilbert Ryle claims that we cannot directly access another's mind. The paper's rethinking of the problem of other minds moves beyond these questions of perceptibility and accessibility. It asks whether there are certain groups of people whose minds are systematically misinterpreted, or even denied mentality. It argues that there are. This claim builds off recent work in philosophy and social psychology on epistemic injustice and the role of social categories in mental state attribution. The paper proposes the Problem of the Other's Mind: the phenomenon of a (relatively) socially privileged person's inability or lack of desire to understand the mind of a (relatively) socially underprivileged person.
引用
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页码:708 / 728
页数:21
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