Benefits and costs of a higher bank "leverage ratio"
被引:25
|
作者:
Barth, James R.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Auburn Univ, 303 Lowder Business Bldg, Auburn, AL 36849 USAAuburn Univ, 303 Lowder Business Bldg, Auburn, AL 36849 USA
Barth, James R.
[1
]
Miller, Stephen Matteo
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
George Mason Univ, Mercatus Ctr, 3434 Washington Blvd,4th Floor, Arlington, VA 22201 USAAuburn Univ, 303 Lowder Business Bldg, Auburn, AL 36849 USA
Miller, Stephen Matteo
[2
]
机构:
[1] Auburn Univ, 303 Lowder Business Bldg, Auburn, AL 36849 USA
[2] George Mason Univ, Mercatus Ctr, 3434 Washington Blvd,4th Floor, Arlington, VA 22201 USA
Bank regulation;
Benefit-cost analysis;
Capital adequacy standards;
US banking crises;
CAPITAL STRUCTURE;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jfs.2018.07.001
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This study reports estimates of the marginal benefits and costs of increasing the regulatory minimum bank equity-to-asset "leverage ratio" from 4 to 15 percent. Benefits arise from reducing the probability of a banking crisis. Costs arise from reduced lending, should banks pass off higher equity costs onto borrowers. Net benefits increase with a higher discount rate, a smaller tax advantage of debt, a lower non-financial corporate debt-to-capital ratio, a higher cost of crises, a longer duration of crises or if crises have some permanent effects. Baseline estimates indicate that the benefits equal costs at 19 percent. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.