Multilateral externalities: Contracts with private information either about costs or benefits

被引：6
|
作者：
Helm, Carsten [1 ]
Wirl, Franz [2 ]
机构：
[1] Carl von Ossietzky Univ Oldenburg, Dept Econ & Law, D-26111 Oldenburg, Germany
[2] Univ Vienna, Fac Business Econ & Stat, Oskar Morgenstern Pl 1,Room 4-635, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2016年 / 141卷
关键词：
Principal-agent; Contracts; Difference due to allocation of private information; Business as usual; Out-of-contract; Permit market;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.020
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This note uses the framework of Martimort and Sand-Zantmann (2013, forthcoming) about international environmental agreements. The objective is to demonstrate how a shift of private information from cost to benefit affects contracts and permit market outcomes although this seemingly ad hoc choice has no effect outside contracts and absent market interventions. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：27 / 31
页数：5
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