Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants

被引:3
|
作者
Karakaya, Mehmet [1 ]
Klaus, Bettina [2 ]
Schlegel, Jan Christoph [3 ]
机构
[1] Izmir Katip Celebi Univ, Dept Econ, TR-35620 Izmir, Turkey
[2] Univ Lausanne, Fac Business & Econ HEC, Internef 538, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
[3] City Univ London, Dept Econ, Northampton Sq, London EC1V 0HB, England
基金
瑞士国家科学基金会;
关键词
Consistency; House allocation; Matching; Strategy-proofness; Top trading cycles; STRATEGY-PROOF ALLOCATION; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; OBJECT ALLOCATION; MECHANISMS; MARKET; ASSIGNMENT;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2019.104948
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the house allocation with existing tenants model (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1999) and consider rules that allocate houses based on priorities. We introduce a new acyclicity requirement and show that for house allocation with existing tenants a top trading cycles (TTC) rule is consistent if and only if its underlying priority structure satisfies our acyclicity condition. Next we give an alternative description of TTC rules based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities in terms of two specific rules, YRMH-IGYT (you request my house - I get your turn) and efficient priority rules, that are applied in two steps. Moreover, even if no priority structure is a priori given, we show that a rule is a top trading cycles rule based on ownership-adapted acyclic priorities if and only if it satisfies Pareto-optimality, individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, and either reallocation-proofness or non-bossiness. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页数:44
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