Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation

被引:42
|
作者
Vives, Xavier [1 ]
机构
[1] IESE Business Sch, Madrid, Spain
来源
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2014年 / 27卷 / 12期
关键词
BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER; BANK RUNS; COORDINATION FAILURES; PUBLIC INFORMATION; FINANCIAL CRISIS; MORAL HAZARD; LAST RESORT; LIQUIDITY; PANICS; MODEL;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhu064
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Fragility is affected by how the balance sheet composition of financial intermediaries, the precision of information signals, and market stress parameters all influence the extent of strategic complementarity among investors' strategies. A solvency and a liquidity ratio are required to control the likelihood of insolvency and illiquidity. The solvency requirement must be strengthened in the face of increased competition, whereas the liquidity requirement must be strengthened under more conservative fund managers and higher penalties for fire sales. Greater disclosure may aggravate fragility and require an increase in the liquidity ratio, so regulators should establish prudential and disclosure policies in tandem.
引用
收藏
页码:3547 / 3592
页数:46
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