Many jurists consider scientific their knowledge and their doing about legal norms - the socalled legal dogmatics or Legal Science (a knowledge focused on issues such as defining the meaning and scope of norms and resolving conflicts between norms and actual or apparent legal gaps). This is done without much reflection, as if the scientific character were a given or a truism. The concept of science, in turn, is the main object of a discipline of philosophical knowledge: Philosophy of Science. In the present article, I intend to understand what science is according to one of the most traditional answers given to this question: the indutivist one. Next, I intend to reflect on whether or not, and to what extent, the inductive answer, its characteristics and its limits are related to the so-called Science of Law. In order to accomplish this, I carried out a theoretical and bibliographical research whose starting point resided in a referential from Philosophy of Science itself. Different sources were examined, systematized and compared in order to identify the most consistent positions. Main results include: an exposition of naive indutivism and its problems, of probabilistic inductivism and of the role of theory in observation; a synthesis of the main features of Legal Science; a critical reflection on how inductivism applies to Legal Science and the character of the latter.
