Research on Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism with Multi-Loss-Averse Retailers

被引:0
|
作者
Liu Heng [1 ]
Pan Jing-ming [1 ]
Tang Xiao-wo [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Elect Sci & Technol China, Sch Management & Econ, Chengdu 610054, Peoples R China
关键词
supply chain; coordination; prospect theory; supermodular game; markdown money contract;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Under the prospect theory, this paper studies the markdown money contract with multi-loss-averse retailers and a risk-neutral supplier based on the supermodular games. It studies the order behaviors of loss-averse retailers in the wholesale price contract and the markdown money contract. It finds out that the order quality from the loss-averse retailers may deviate from the optimized quality of the system and that markdown money contract can coordinate the supply chain. At last, the effectiveness of markdown money contract is verified coordination by two numerical examples.
引用
收藏
页码:2585 / 2589
页数:5
相关论文
共 10 条
  • [1] CACHON N, 2003, GAME THEORY SUPPLY C
  • [2] Daniel Kahneman, 1979, ECONOMETRICA, V47, P92, DOI [10.2307/1914185, DOI 10.2307/1914185]
  • [3] Reducing the cost of demand uncertainty through accurate response to early sales
    Fisher, M
    Raman, A
    [J]. OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1996, 44 (01) : 87 - 99
  • [4] Gan XH, 2005, PROD OPER MANAG, V14, P80
  • [5] Hou Lin-lin, 2008, Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, V14, P379
  • [6] Decision bias in the newsvendor problem with a known demand distribution: Experimental evidence
    Schweitzer, ME
    Cachon, GP
    [J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2000, 46 (03) : 404 - 420
  • [7] Suo Han-sheng, 2004, Control and Decision, V19, P1042
  • [8] Manufacturer's revenue-sharing contract and retail competition
    Yao, Z.
    Leung, Stephen C. H.
    Lai, K. K.
    [J]. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2008, 186 (02) : 637 - 651
  • [9] [叶飞 YE Fei], 2006, [工业工程与管理, Industrial engineering and management], V11, P1
  • [10] [于春云 YU Chunyun], 2007, [中国管理科学, Chinese Journal of Management Science], V15, P31