A field guide to recent species of naturalism

This review of recent work in the philosophy of science motivated by a commitment to 'naturalism' begins by identifying three key axioms and one theorem shared by philosophers thus self-styled. Owing much to Quine and Ernest Nagel, these philosophers of science share a common agenda with naturalists elsewhere in philosophy. But they have disagreed among themselves about how the axioms and the theorems they share settle long-standing disputes in the philosophy of science. After expounding these disagreements in the work of Boyd, Giere, Laudan, and Kitcher, I argue that naturalism needs to look for more than mere consistency in its foundations. 1 Realism's need for naturalism 2 Naturalism without realism 3 Naturalism is in the details 4 Naturalism for all seasons 5 Naturalism and knowledge 6 Naturalism's Darwinian roots