Does Market Power Encourage or Discourage Investment? Evidence from the Hospital Market

被引:6
|
作者
Patel, Elena [1 ]
Seegert, Nathan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS | 2020年 / 63卷 / 04期
关键词
FOR-PROFIT; MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION; NONPROFIT; CARE; EQUILIBRIUM; INNOVATION; UNCERTAINTY; OWNERSHIP; MERGERS; MODEL;
D O I
10.1086/709556
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Does market power encourage or discourage investment? This is an open question due to theoretical ambiguity and empirical difficulties. The answer is particularly important in the hospital market, where market power has increased dramatically since the 1990s. To answer this, we exploit an investment tax shock and data on the universe of US hospitals. We find a negative relationship between competition and investment. In particular, hospitals in concentrated markets increased investment by 5.1 percent ($2.5 million) more than firms in competitive markets in response to tax incentives. Further, firms' investment responses monotonically increased with market concentration.
引用
收藏
页码:667 / 698
页数:32
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