Customers' abandonment strategy in an M/G/1 queue

被引:2
|
作者
Sherzer, Eliran [1 ]
Kerner, Yoav [1 ]
机构
[1] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel
基金
以色列科学基金会;
关键词
Queuing system; Nash equilibrium; Abandonment; IMPATIENT CUSTOMERS; INVISIBLE QUEUES;
D O I
10.1007/s11134-017-9567-5
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
We consider an M/G/1 queue in which the customers, while waiting in line, may renege from it. We show the Nash equilibrium profile among customers and show that it is defined by two sequences of thresholds. For each customer, the decision is based on the observed past (which determines from what sequence the threshold is taken) and the observed queue length (which determines the appropriate element in the chosen sequence). We construct a set of equations that has the Nash equilibrium as its solution and discuss the relationships between the properties of the service time distribution and the properties of the Nash equilibrium, such as uniqueness and finiteness.
引用
收藏
页码:65 / 87
页数:23
相关论文
共 50 条