Comment on "Lightweight Secure Message Broadcasting Protocol for Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication"

In the advanced technological world, vehicular communications are used in numerous business and safety applications for smart traffic management. With the help of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication, users can transfer substantial information directly to the reachable vehicles. Generally, the movement of vehicles on the highway is faster than crossroads, thus, to communicate securely and efficiently, a robust vehicular communication system is required. Therefore, a number of message dissemination protocols have been designed by the researchers, but distinct interests (i.e, storage cost, high communication overhead, more execution time, and security threats) are sought in these systems, which lead toward unreliability for on-the-fly communication. Very recently, Limbasiya-Das (IEEE SYSTEM JOURNAL, pp 1937-9234, 10.1109/JSYST.2019.2932807) introduced a hash-based secure and efficient V2V data dissemination protocol to transfer significant information at the receiver end. Limbasiya-Das claimed the security of their protocol against numerous security attacks. However, in this comment, we highlight the loopholes of Limbasiya-Das protocol and show that their protocol is vulnerable to impersonation attack. Moreover, it has irrelevant usage of timestamp and does not offer user's anonymity. In addition, it lacks message confidentiality because an adversary can determine and view the messages exchanged among the legitimate vehicles by intercepting the messages disseminated over public channel. Finally, we provide probable remedy to mitigate the deficiencies of Limbasiya-Das protocol.