PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms' financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?

被引:1
|
作者
Rousseau, Denise M. [1 ,2 ]
Beck, Donna [3 ]
Kim, ByeongJo [1 ]
Splenda, Ryan [3 ]
Young, Sarah [3 ]
机构
[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Heinz Coll, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
[2] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Tepper Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
[3] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Univ Lib, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1002/cl2.1064
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
This is the protocol for a Campbell review. The objectives are as follows: One goal of this systematic review is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict firm financial performance over time; a second goal is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict subsequent inaccurate financial reporting as manifest in restatement of accounting data due to errors or other distortions in reporting financial information.
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页数:6
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