The Game Analysis of Automobile Industry Vertical Cooperative Innovation Based on Supply Chain Financing

This paper researches how upstream and downstream enterprises in automobile industry chain utilize the model of supply chain financing to finance for technology innovation as well as reduce innovation risk. In this paper, a vertical cooperative innovation game model under nontechnical spillover condition is constructed. From the view of supply chain financing for technology innovation, with the help of backward induction, the paper aims at a double check automobile industrial structure including an upstream components and parts manufacturer and a downstream vehicle manufacturer, and compare the strategy selections and expected profit functions under cooperative innovation and non-cooperative innovation condition between upstream and downstream. It turns out that with respect to noncooperation innovation, cooperation innovation possess the higher expected profit of industry chain, optimal output, and Pareto improvement. Innovation degree, the unit product cost reduction degree brought by technology innovation, of cooperation and noncooperation game are both higher than that of static game. In the meantime, were the innovation success rate higher than 50%, the innovation extent of cooperation innovation is higher than the dynamic game one, or vice versa.