Evolutionary Game Analysis of Dangerous-Waste Disposal of Major Engineering Enterprises and Government Supervision

被引:0
|
作者
Xu, Xiaoran [1 ]
Li, Yulong [1 ,2 ]
Hou, Xiangyu [3 ]
Zeng, Saixing [2 ]
机构
[1] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Dept Management Sci & Engn, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[3] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Management Sci & Engn, Beijing, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号
0813 ;
摘要
The construction environment of major infrastructure projects is complex and difficult to construct, and enterprises are easy to ignore the disposal and management of "hazardous wastes" with great potential harm to environmental pollution during the working hours of the facilities under construction. There is also a lack of regulatory measures and policies. In this paper, the evolutionary game model is used to analyze how to make the insurance company, the construction company, and the government achieve the effective supervision strategy of joint governance and policy supervision under the assumption of bounded rationality. Based on the derivation of evolutionary game theory, the parameters were set and the influence of key parameters on the evolutionary behavior was deduced and verified, which provided an effective supervision strategy for solving the ecological and environmental problems existing in the construction of major engineering projects.
引用
收藏
页码:554 / 560
页数:7
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