Managerial Incentives to Increase Risk Provided by Debt, Stock, and Options

被引：28

作者：

Anderson, Joshua D. ^{[1
]}

Core, John E. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Boston Univ, Questrom Sch Business, Boston, MA 02215 USA

[2] MIT, MIT Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2018年 / 64卷 / 09期

关键词：

accounting; finance; corporate finance; investment; risk taking; incentives; PAY ME LATER; ENDOGENOUS REGRESSOR; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; MEASUREMENT ERROR; CORPORATE-DEBT; COMPENSATION; MODEL; FIRM; INVESTMENT; POLICIES;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.2017.2811

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

We measure a manager's risk-taking incentives as the total sensitivity of the manager's debt, stock, and option holdings to firm volatility. We compare this measure with the option vega and with the relative measures used by the prior literature. Vega does not capture risk-taking incentives from managers' stock and debt holdings and does not reflect the fact that employee options are warrants. The relative measures do not incorporate the sensitivity of options to volatility. Our new measure explains risk choices better than vega and the relative measures and should be useful for future research on managers' risk choices.

引用

页码：4408 / 4432

页数：25

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