What anti-realism in philosophy of mathematics must offer

被引：5
|
作者：
Ye, Feng [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Peking Univ, Dept Philosophy, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China
[2] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, China Inst Adv Study, Beijing, Peoples R China
来源：
SYNTHESE | 2010年 / 175卷 / 01期
关键词：
Philosophy of mathematics; Anti-realism; Realism; Naturalism; INDISPENSABILITY;
D O I：
10.1007/s11229-009-9535-7
中图分类号：
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要：
This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach to philosophy of mathematics. It belongs to anti-realism, but can meet those challenges and can perhaps convince some realists, at least those who are also naturalists.
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页码：13 / 31
页数：19
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