In defense of the emotions (and passions too)

Sabini and Silver argue ("On the Possible Non-Existence of Emotions: The Passions" (JTSB, 1997) that there are (or might be) no emotions. They are not just arguing, what I take to be true, that (1) emotions do not constitute a proper class or that (2) an emotion is not a "thing" or entity. They are-or seem to be-advocating serious reductionism, perhaps even an "eliminitivism" in which all talk of emotions (in both common sense and in philosophy) should be replaced by talk about desire and belief. I argue that emotions constitute a rich and subtle field of complex phenomena which are by no means reducible to the crude, artificial and grossly inadequate ontology of "beliefs and desires". Emotions are real enough. Happily, Sabini and Silver believe this too. They don't really mean what they say.