KEPLER: Facilitating Control-flow Hijacking Primitive Evaluation for Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities

被引:0
|
作者
Wu, Wei [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Chen, Yueqi [2 ]
Xing, Xinyu [2 ]
Zou, Wei [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Informat Engn, CAS KLONAT, Key Lab Network Assessment Technol,CAS, Beijing, Peoples R China
[2] Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Informat Engn, BKLONSPT, Beijing, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Cyber Secur, Beijing, Peoples R China
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Automatic exploit generation is a challenging problem. A challenging part of the task is to connect an identified exploitable state (exploit primitive) to triggering execution of code-reuse (e.g., ROP) payload. A control-flow hijacking primitive is one of the most common capabilities for exploitation. However, due to the challenges of widely deployed exploit mitigations, pitfalls along an exploit path, and ill-suited primitives, it is difficult to even manually craft an exploit with a control-flow hijacking primitive for an off-the-shelf modern Linux kernel. We propose KEPLER to facilitate exploit generation by automatically generating a "single-shot" exploitation chain. KEPLER accepts as input a control-flow hijacking primitive and bootstraps any kernel ROP payload by symbolically stitching an exploitation chain taking advantage of prevalent kernel coding style and corresponding gadgets. Comparisons with previous automatic exploit generation techniques and previous kernel exploit techniques show KEPLER effectively facilitates evaluation of control-flow hijacking primitives in the Linux kernel.
引用
收藏
页码:1187 / 1204
页数:18
相关论文
共 25 条
  • [1] Beyond the Edges of Kernel Control-Flow Hijacking Protection with HEK-CFI
    Maar, Lukas
    Nasahl, Pascal
    Mangard, Stefan
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH ACM ASIA CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, ACM ASIACCS 2024, 2024, : 866 - 882
  • [2] SLAKE: Facilitating Slab Manipulation for Exploiting Vulnerabilities in the Linux Kernel
    Chen, Yueqi
    Xing, Xinyu
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (CCS'19), 2019, : 1707 - 1722
  • [3] Control-Flow Hijacking: Are We Making Progress?
    Payer, Mathias
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 ACM ASIA CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (ASIA CCS'17), 2017, : 4 - 4
  • [4] AEM: Facilitating Cross-Version Exploitability Assessment of Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities
    Jiang, Zheyue
    Zhang, Yuan
    Xu, Jun
    Sun, Xinqian
    Liu, Zhuang
    Yang, Min
    2023 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY, SP, 2023, : 2122 - 2137
  • [5] SMP: A New Mechanism to Mitigate Control-Flow Hijacking Attacks
    Lu, Guorui
    Chen, Liwei
    Shi, Gang
    2018 3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS ENGINEERING (ICISE), 2018, : 51 - 55
  • [6] Method against process control-flow hijacking based on mimic defense
    Pan C.
    Zhang Z.
    Ma B.
    Yao Y.
    Ji X.
    Tongxin Xuebao/Journal on Communications, 2021, 42 (01): : 37 - 47
  • [7] A Synergistic Security Method for Control-Flow Hijacking Detection using SPNs
    Trikalinou, Anna
    Bourbakis, Nikolaos
    2013 FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION, INTELLIGENCE, SYSTEMS AND APPLICATIONS (IISA 2013), 2013, : 270 - 274
  • [8] JITScope: Protecting Web Users from Control-Flow Hijacking Attacks
    Zhang, Chao
    Niknami, Mehrdad
    Chen, Kevin Zhijie
    Song, Chengyu
    Chen, Zhaofeng
    Song, Dawn
    2015 IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS (INFOCOM), 2015,
  • [9] Automated Detection of Persistent Kernel Control-Flow Attacks
    Petroni, Nick L., Jr.
    Hicks, Michael
    CCS'07: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, 2007, : 103 - 115
  • [10] Fine-Grained Control-Flow Integrity for Kernel Software
    Ge, Xinyang
    Talele, Nirupama
    Payer, Mathias
    Jaeger, Trent
    1ST IEEE EUROPEAN SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY, 2016, : 179 - 194