Form over function in finance: international institutional design by bricolage

Dominant perspectives in International Relations start from the assumption that the problem-constellation determines international institutional design. Given the difficulty these ends-oriented approaches face when explaining institutional inefficiencies and pathologies, this article develops an alternate perspective based on anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss's concept of bricolage. Design by bricolage starts from the premise that actors are means-focused, seeking to recombine and redeploy tools from their existing environment. Designers constantly experiment, adapting institutional elements from cognate fields, with the aim of creating novel institutional arrangements. The outcomes of international cooperation are a function of the design process, more than the initial problem type. To illustrate the usefulness of this perspective, the paper examines the evolution of the International Financial Architecture, with a focus on the evolution of the international securities regime. A design by bricolage perspective is well positioned to make sense of enduring International Relations puzzles such as why second-best solutions often persist yet later succeed, and, importantly, re-opens the conversation on agency in international institutional design that has been downplayed by conventional, structural approaches. The design of international institutional elements is frequently experimental where form trumps function.