Why do CEOs reciprocally sit on each other's boards?

被引:86
|
作者
Fich, EM [1 ]
White, LJ
机构
[1] Drexel Univ, LeBow Coll Business, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[2] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10012 USA
关键词
interlocking directorates; CEOs; board of directors; corporate governance; stock options;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2003.06.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The reciprocal interlocking of chief executive officers is a non-trivial phenomenon: among large companies in 1991, about one company in seven was in a relationship whereby the CEO of one company sat on a second company's board and the second company's CEO sat on the first company's board. We develop hypotheses to distinguish whether this practice furthers the interests of shareholders or the private interests of the CEOs. Using a sample of large companies, we employ a probit model to test these hypotheses. Our empirical findings are that these reciprocal CEO interlocks primarily benefit the CEOs rather than their shareholders. (C) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:175 / 195
页数:21
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