Single-Leader-Multiple-Followers Stackelberg Security Game With Hypergame Framework

被引：19
|
作者：
Chengu, Zhaoyang [1 ,2 ]
Chen, Guanpu [1 ,3 ]
Hong, Yiguang [1 ,4 ,5 ]
机构：
[1] Acad Math & Syst Sci, Key Lab Syst & Control, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Sch Math Sci, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
[3] JD Explore Acad, Beijing 100176, Peoples R China
[4] Tongji Univ, Dept Control Sci & Engn, Shanghai 201804, Peoples R China
[5] Tongji Univ, Shanghai Res Inst Intelligent Autonomous Syst, Shanghai 201804, Peoples R China
来源：
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY | 2022年 / 17卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Games; Security; Stability criteria; Power system stability; Fake news; Robustness; Cognition; Stackelberg security game; hypergame; misperception; deception; cognition; stability; INFORMATION SECURITY; NASH; PRIVACY;
D O I：
10.1109/TIFS.2022.3155294
中图分类号：
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号：
081202 ;
摘要：
In this paper, we employ a hypergame framework to analyze the single-leader-multiple-followers (SLMF) Stackelberg security game with two typical misinformed situations: misperception and deception. We provide a stability criterion with the help of hyper Nash equilibrium (HNE) to investigate both strategic stability and cognitive stability of equilibria in SLMF games with misinformation. In fact, we find mild stable conditions such that the equilibria with misperception and deception can become HNE. Moreover, we discuss the robustness of the equilibria to reveal whether players have the ability to keep their profits under the influence of some misinformation.
引用
收藏
页码：954 / 969
页数：16
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