Pakistan's Evolving Strategic Outlook: Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence

被引:0
|
作者
Khan, Zulfqar [1 ]
机构
[1] Natl Def Univ, Dept Strateg Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan
来源
KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS | 2016年 / 28卷 / 01期
关键词
Pakistan; India; South Asia; nuclear deterrence; strategy; nuclear weapons; security; escalation; battlefield nuclear weapons; POWER;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
It is argued that, Pakistan's "full spectrum" nuclear strategy is based upon the concept of proportionate calibration against the perceived threat of a limited strike by the conventionally much superior military forces of India. Pakistan's strategy is emitting robust signaling vis-a-vis the apparent strikes with the objective to deter the adversary from operationalizing its flawed limited war doctrine. Moreover, its strategic nuclear forces would perform the function of a dynamic reserve asset and as an ultimate deterrent against India. Most significantly, it would convince India of consequences in the case of deliberate escalation of a crisis or plan of a limited military operation. In essence, it also sufficiently reflects Pakistan's preparation and "willingness to fight." In the absence of a conflict resolution mechanism, diplomatic dialogue, both countries' nuclear deterrent capabilities are expected to perpetuate the element of uncertainty especially during crises.
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页码:103 / 121
页数:19
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