Effort, performance, and conscientiousness: An agency theory perspective

被引:58
|
作者
Fong, Eric A. [1 ]
Tosi, Henry L., Jr.
机构
[1] Univ Alabama, Dept Management & Mkt, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
[2] Univ Florida, Dept Management, Warrington Coll Business Adm, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA
关键词
agency theory; conscientiousness; incentive alignment; monitoring;
D O I
10.1177/0149206306298658
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The authors examine the moderating effects of conscientiousness on the relationships between agency controls and effort and agency controls and task performance. Results show that less conscientious individuals appear to increase effort through incentive alignment and monitoring, whereas conscientious individuals do not shirk with or without agency controls. Furthermore, results show that less conscientious individuals increase task performance through incentive alignment, but not through monitoring. The study confirms that motivation to act opportunistically differs between individuals unlike what is assumed by agency theory. Also, incentive alignment may be more effective than monitoring when attempting to align principal and agent interests.
引用
收藏
页码:161 / 179
页数:19
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