Worker Participation in Decision-making, Worker Sorting, and Firm Performance

被引:3
|
作者
Mueller, Steffen [1 ,2 ]
Neuschaeffer, Georg [1 ]
机构
[1] Halle Inst Econ Res IWH, Kleine Markerstr 8, D-06108 Halle, Germany
[2] Otto von Guericke Univ, Germany & CESifo, Munich, Germany
来源
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS | 2021年 / 60卷 / 04期
基金
欧盟地平线“2020”;
关键词
HIGH WAGE WORKERS; LABOR PRODUCTIVITY; 1ST EVIDENCE; COUNCILS; ESTABLISHMENT; GERMANY; MOBILITY; STILL; QUITS; REPRESENTATION;
D O I
10.1111/irel.12288
中图分类号
F24 [劳动经济];
学科分类号
020106 ; 020207 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Worker participation in decision-making is often associated with high-wage and high-productivity firm strategies. Using linked employer-employee data for Germany and worker fixed effects from a two-way fixed-effects model of wages capturing observed and unobserved worker quality, we find that plants with formal worker participation via works councils indeed employ higher quality workers. We show that worker quality is already higher in plants before council introduction and further increases after the introduction. Importantly, we corroborate previous studies by showing positive productivity and profitability effects even after taking into account worker sorting.
引用
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页码:436 / 478
页数:43
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